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What is clearing and why is it important?
by Ed Nosal, vice president and senior financial economist, and Robert Steigerwald, senior financial markets advisor
In the financial market disruption of 2007–08, the once arcane topic of clearing 
of financial products took center stage in major policy debates. Generally speaking, 
clearing has to do with the nuts and bolts of the contractual performance of financial 
products after they have been traded.
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What is clearing? Clearing 
is a set of institutions, rela-
tionships, and processes 
that are specifically designed 
to support performance of 







































































liver­five­pounds­of­corn­at­a­given­time­Almost anything that happens after an initial contract is executed, 
i.e., after the buyer and seller agree to the contract terms, and 













Clearing financial contracts:  
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Central clearing in general
A­big­operation­in­any­central­counter-
party­is­risk­management.­In­all­of­our­
examples,­the­central­counterparty­faces­
no­risk.­The­central­counterparty­holds­
$10—$5­each­from­the­farmer­and­baker.­
In­the­event­that­the­farmer­or­baker­
defaults,­the­maximum­amount­that­the­
central­counterparty­needs­to­guaran-
tee­performance­is­$5.­But­in­the­real­
world,­prices­of­commodities­or­assets­
do­not­move­in­small,­finite,­discrete­
amounts­over­a­specific­time­interval.­
Typically,­short-term­price­movements­
are­not­very­large­in­relative­terms,­but­
one­can’t­rule­out­enormous­price­move-
ments­over­a­period­of­a­few­hours.­
Suppose­there­is­a­large­price­movement­
and,­as­a­result,­some­parties­default­­
on­their­contracts­with­the­central­coun-
terparty.­Can­the­central­counterparty­
guarantee­performance?­The­central­
counterparty­could­guarantee­perfor-
mance­if­it­required­enormous­amounts­
of­collateral.­But­collateral­is­costly:­Par-
ties­have­more­productive­uses­for­their­
resources­and­do­not­want­them­tied­up­
as­collateral.­If­a­central­counterparty­de-
manded­sufficiently­huge­margins—so­
as­to­cover­any­conceivable­price­move-
ment—people­would­simply­stop­using­
forward­contracts­(tied­to­future­prices),­
since­they­are­too­costly,­and­would­­
instead­transact­on­spot­markets­(im-
mediate­transactions­at­current­prices).
Alternatively,­the­central­counterparty­
could­rely­on­other­resources­to­sup-
plement­the­parties’­collateral.­For­ex-
ample,­a­central­counterparty­could­
obtain­insurance­against­the­possibility­
of­default.­A­more­common­approach,­
however,­is­loss­mutualization.­In­the­
event­that­the­margins­of­defaulting­
agents­are­insufficient­to­guarantee­
performance,­the­central­counterparty­
may­draw­on­resources­in­a­guaranty­
fund­to­which­all­participants­in­the­
clearing­arrangement­contribute.­­In­such­arrangements,­the­loss­is­
shared­or­mutualized­among­the­non-
defaulting­participants.­
Conclusion
Now,­we­are­able­to­answer­the­questions­
we­posed­at­the­outset­of­this­article.­
What­is­clearing?­Clearing­is­a­set­of­
institutions,­relationships,­and­processes­
that­are­specifically­designed­to­support­
performance­of­contracts,­which­are­
effectively­promises.­By­way­of­a­series­
of­simple­examples,­we­have­been­able­
to­identify­some­important­aspects­of­
clearing,­such­as­the­existence­of­a­central­
counterparty,­novation,­margin­require-
ments,­and­loss­mutualization.­In­fact,­
almost­anything­that­happens­after­an­
initial­contract­is­executed,­i.e.,­after­the­
buyer­and­seller­agree­to­the­contract­
terms,­and­before­final­settlement­occurs­
should­be­viewed­as­clearing.­So­trade­
confirmation,­trade­matching,­and­in-
formation­warehousing—i.e.,­checking­
to­make­sure­party­A­entered­into­a­con-
tract;­verifying­that­party­B­is,­in­fact,­on­
the­other­side­of­the­contract;­and­com-
piling­in­an­accessible­manner­the­set­
of­all­the­trades­that­have­taken­place—
are­also­part­of­clearing.­It­is­important­
to­emphasize­that­these­clearing­institu-
tions­and­processes­arise­only­because­
people­cannot­commit.­Clearing­is­a­
substitute­for­commitment,­although­
not­a­perfect­one.
Why­is­clearing­important?­In­the­ab-
sence­of­clearing,­contractual­perfor-
mance­of­many­financial­products­would­
be­severely­impaired­and,­as­a­result,­so-
ciety­would­have­to­resort­to­less­efficient­
means­of­exchange.